The Sterling-Dollar-Franc Triangle: Monetary Diplomacy 1929–1937
- 1 October 1985
- journal article
- Published by Project MUSE in World Politics
- Vol. 38 (1) , 173-199
- https://doi.org/10.2307/2010355
Abstract
The late interwar years encompass a full spectrum of international monetary conflict and cooperation. Why did Great Britain, France, and the United States cooperate in some periods and not in others? First, the transience of monetary cooperation and conflict is explained in part by inherent characteristics of gold exchange and floating monetary systems. Second, environmental changes—swings between prosperity and depression, between peace and the threat of war, and between monetary orthodoxy and inflationist heresy—altered the strategic setting confronting the central monetary powers. Third, the actions of governments both followed from and shaped the circumstances that they confronted. Through strategies of composition across issues and decomposition across time and actors, nations deliberately fostered the emergence of cooperation by altering the context of monetary diplomacy.Keywords
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