Economic Insights from Internet Auctions
Top Cited Papers
- 1 May 2004
- journal article
- Published by American Economic Association in Journal of Economic Literature
- Vol. 42 (2) , 457-486
- https://doi.org/10.1257/0022051041409075
Abstract
This paper surveys recent studies of internet auctions. Four main areas of research are summarized. First, we survey several studies that document and attempt to explain the frequently observed sniping, or last-second bidding behavior, in these auctions. Second, we summarize several methods proposed to quantify the distortions caused by asymmetric information in these markets, most notably due to the winner's curse. Third, we explore research about the role of reputation mechanisms installed to help combat these distortions. Finally, we discuss what internet auctions have to teach us about auction design.Keywords
This publication has 33 references indexed in Scilit:
- How to Set Minimum Acceptable Bids, with an Application to Real Estate AuctionsJournal of Industrial Economics, 2002
- Identification of Standard Auction ModelsEconometrica, 2002
- Does a Seller’s eCommerce Reputation Matter? Evidence from eBay AuctionsJournal of Industrial Economics, 2002
- Last-Minute Bidding and the Rules for Ending Second-Price Auctions: Evidence from eBay and Amazon Auctions on the InternetAmerican Economic Review, 2002
- Business-to-Business Electronic CommerceJournal of Economic Perspectives, 2001
- Auction Theory: A Guide to the LiteratureJournal of Economic Surveys, 1999
- Can Asset Markets Be Manipulated? A Field Experiment With Racetrack BettingJournal of Political Economy, 1998
- Hedonic Prices and Implicit Markets: Estimating Demand and Supply Functions for Differentiated ProductsJournal of Political Economy, 1987
- Competitive Bidding for Contracts under Alternative Auction ProceduresJournal of Political Economy, 1980
- INCENTIVES AND BEHAVIOR IN ENGLISH, DUTCH AND SEALED-BID AUCTIONSEconomic Inquiry, 1980