The Legal Penalties for Financial Misrepresentation
- 2 May 2007
- preprint
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Abstract
This paper provides the first integrated analysis of the complex mix of private and regulatory penalties for financial misrepresentation. We examine the sizes, types, and determinants of legal penalties imposed for all 697 enforcement actions initiated by the Securities and Exchange Commission for financial misrepresentation from 1978 through 2004. These penalties include private class action awards, monetary penalties imposed by the SEC and Department of Justice, and such non-monetary sanctions as censures, trading suspensions, and jail time. Contrary to many criticisms of private lawsuits and regulatory actions, we find that legal penalties are highly systematic, and in particular, are positively related to the size and severity of the harm from the misconduct. The data also indicate deep pockets effects, as both private and regulatory monetary penalties are related to defendants' abilities to pay. A recent increase in regulatory penalties has coincided with a decrease in private monetary penalties, consistent with regulatory penalties crowding out the use of private penalties.Keywords
This publication has 15 references indexed in Scilit:
- Predicting Material Accounting Misstatements*Contemporary Accounting Research, 2011
- Has New York Become Less Competitive in Global Markets? Evaluating Foreign Listing Choices Over TimePublished by National Bureau of Economic Research ,2007
- The determinants of corporate board size and composition: An empirical analysisPublished by Elsevier ,2007
- Earnings management, stock issues, and shareholder lawsuitsJournal of Financial Economics, 2004
- Outside Director LiabilitySSRN Electronic Journal, 2003
- Regulating Corporate Criminal Sanctions: Federal Guidelines and the Sentencing of Public FirmsThe Journal of Law and Economics, 1999
- The Shareholder Wealth Implications of Corporate LawsuitsFinancial Management, 1998
- Theories of punishment and empirical trends in corporate criminal sanctionsManagerial and Decision Economics, 1996
- New evidence on the origins of corporate crimeManagerial and Decision Economics, 1996
- Crime and Punishment: An Economic ApproachJournal of Political Economy, 1968