Hierarchical structure and the social costs of bribes and transfers
- 1 November 1987
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Public Economics
- Vol. 34 (2) , 129-142
- https://doi.org/10.1016/0047-2727(87)90016-8
Abstract
No abstract availableThis publication has 20 references indexed in Scilit:
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