Evolutionary Selection in Normal Form Games

Preprint
Publisher Website
Google Scholar
    • preprint
      • Published in RePEc
Abstract
This paper investigates stability properties of evolutionary selection dynamics in normal-form games. The analysis is focused on deterministic dynamics in continuous time and on asymptotic stability of sets of population states, more precisely of faces of the mixed-strategy space. The main result is a characterization of those faces that are asymptotically stable in all dynamics from a certain class, and the authors show that every such face contains an essential component of the set of Nash equilibria and, hence, a strategically stable set in the sense of E. Kohlberg and J. F. Mertens (1986). Copyright 1995 by The Econometric Society. (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.) (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
All Related Versions

This publication has 0 references indexed in Scilit: