The Dialogical Brain

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Abstract
Using theory and data from emotional neurobiology, I suggest a neurally realistic model of the dialogical self. The model is premised on Hermans' idea of voicing and its implications for motivation, action and subjectivity. Because states of motivated attention unify brain activity, coexisting I-positions are as problematic for neuroscience as they are for psychology. To overcome this problem, I postulate an internal monologue in which the familiar I-position is subserved by an attentional system in the orbitofrontal cortex, linked with nearby affective and premotor areas. This internal monologue is fueled by gist-like perceptual expectancies of an-other's response, and it perpetuates and adjusts itself by updating these expectancies. A second I-position may be underpinned by an attentional system in the anterior cingulate cortex and its connections. These two attentional systems are partly independent, and they compete for control based on changes in emotional content and intensity. Thus, switching activation between them may account for semi-autonomous, but not coexisting, I-positions.