An empirical study of applied game theory: transmission constrained Cournot behavior
- 7 August 2002
- journal article
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Power Systems
- Vol. 17 (1) , 166-172
- https://doi.org/10.1109/59.982209
Abstract
Restructured energy markets present opportunities for the exercise of market power, meaning market players can potentially maintain prices in excess of competitive prices. In this paper, we investigate Cournot equilibrium in a simple example network. We analyze three market players in a transmission-constrained system and consider nonconstant marginal cost. Several scenarios are evaluated that show a pure strategy equilibrium can break down even when a transmission constraint exceeds the value of the unconstrained Cournot equilibrium line flow.Keywords
This publication has 3 references indexed in Scilit:
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- Financial Transmission Rights Meet Cournot: How TCCs Curb Market Power*The Energy Journal, 1999
- An Empirical Analysis of the Potential for Market Power in California's Electricity IndustryPublished by National Bureau of Economic Research ,1998