Measuring the welfare of the child: in search of the appropriate evaluation principle

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Abstract
Everybody agrees on the fundamental importance of the welfare of the child when judging the applicability of new reproductive technologies. However, this is as far as the consensus goes. The moral problem can be presented as the opposition between the right of the would-be parents to procreate and the well-being of the child. The positions on this issue are largely determined by one's view on parental responsibility (Pennings, 1995b). The most frequently mentioned difficulty is that there are no reliable predictive criteria for inadequate parenting and, thus, no criteria which can be used to guarantee the best interests of the child (Harris, 1990). If we cannot reach a consensus on minimum parental capabilities, how can we introduce a licence or a test to exclude incompetent candidates for parenthood? (Lafollette, 1980). The second, and less well-known, problem concerns the choice of the principle to interpret the level or measure of welfare. Even if we were able to calculate the `global welfare' of the child, we would still have to evaluate the result. The principles outlined in this article can be seen as positions on a continuum between the absolute autonomy of the parents on the one hand and exclusive concern for the welfare of the offspring on the other.

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