Cheap talk can matter in bargaining
- 1 June 1989
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Theory
- Vol. 48 (1) , 221-237
- https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(89)90125-7
Abstract
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All Related Versions
This publication has 12 references indexed in Scilit:
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- Bargaining under Incomplete InformationOperations Research, 1983
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