The licensing of patents under asymmetric information
- 30 June 1992
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in International Journal of Industrial Organization
- Vol. 10 (2) , 171-191
- https://doi.org/10.1016/0167-7187(92)90014-p
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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