Making Descriptive Use of Prospect Theory to Improve the Prescriptive Use of Expected Utility

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Abstract
This paper proposes a quantitative modification of standard utility elicitation procedures, such as the probability and certainty equivalence methods, to correct for commonly observed violations of expected utility. Traditionally, decision analysis assumes expected utility not only for the prescriptive purpose of calculating optimal decisions but also for the descriptive purpose of eliciting utilities. However, descriptive violations of expected utility bias utility elicitations. That such biases are effective became clear when systematic discrepancies were found between different utility elicitation methods that, under expected utility, should have yielded identical utilities. As it is not clear how to correct for these biases without further knowledge of their size or nature, most utility elicitations still calculate utilities by means of the expected utility formula. This paper speculates on the biases and their sizes by using the quantitative assessments of probability transformation and loss aversion suggested by prospect theory. It presents quantitative corrections for the probability and certainty equivalence methods. If interactive sessions to correct for biases are not possible, then the authors propose to use the corrected utilities rather than the uncorrected ones in prescriptions of optimal decisions. In an experiment, the discrepancies between the probability and certainty equivalence methods are removed by the authors' proposal.

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