New equilibria for noncooperative two?person games
- 1 May 1980
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Taylor & Francis in The Journal of Mathematical Sociology
- Vol. 7 (1) , 15-26
- https://doi.org/10.1080/0022250x.1980.9989896
Abstract
New equilibrium concepts for noncooperative two‐person games are introduced and examined. Although these equilibria coincide with the Nash equilibria in all constant‐sum games, they differ significantly in other cases. In particular, for finite repetitions of the prisoner's dilemma, some cooperating strategy combinations become equilibria.Keywords
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