FIRM PARTICIPATION IN STEEL INDUSTRY LOBBYING
- 1 January 1991
- journal article
- Published by Wiley in Economic Inquiry
- Vol. 29 (1) , 134-147
- https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1465-7295.1991.tb01259.x
Abstract
Why do firms participate in steel industry lobbying to obtain antidumping and countervailing duties? In contrast to previous work, we find that economic variables, measured at the industry level, do not significantly affect the degree of participation by individual firms. We find that steel producers tend to free‐ride, but firms in segments of the steel industry that can control free riding tend to participate more. We also find that the distribution of benefits and the costs of contributing are significant determinants of the number of contributing firms.Keywords
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