Optimal auction design and R&D
- 1 December 1997
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in European Economic Review
- Vol. 41 (9) , 1655-1674
- https://doi.org/10.1016/s0014-2921(96)00033-5
Abstract
No abstract availableThis publication has 9 references indexed in Scilit:
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- Repeated Auctions of Incentive Contracts, Investment, and Bidding Parity with an Application to TakeoversThe RAND Journal of Economics, 1988
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- Bidding for Contracts: A Principal-Agent AnalysisThe RAND Journal of Economics, 1986
- Optimal Auction DesignMathematics of Operations Research, 1981