Managerial compensation and the agency costs of debt finance
- 1 January 1992
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Wiley in Managerial and Decision Economics
- Vol. 13 (1) , 55-64
- https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.4090130107
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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