Strategic aspects of vertical delegation
- 1 April 1995
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in European Economic Review
- Vol. 39 (3-4) , 421-431
- https://doi.org/10.1016/0014-2921(94)00048-5
Abstract
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All Related Versions
This publication has 13 references indexed in Scilit:
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