Policy Watch: Developments in Antitrust Economics
- 1 February 1999
- journal article
- Published by American Economic Association in Journal of Economic Perspectives
- Vol. 13 (1) , 181-194
- https://doi.org/10.1257/jep.13.1.181
Abstract
This article highlights recent developments in antitrust economics that have influenced the way the federal antitrust enforcement agencies analyze five issues: efficiencies from mergers, entry conditions, practices facilitating coordination, exclusionary practices, and the unilateral competitive effects of mergers.Keywords
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