Explaining Incomplete Contracts as the Result of Contract-Reading Costs
- 25 October 2001
- journal article
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in Advances in Economic Analysis&Policy
- Vol. 1 (1)
- https://doi.org/10.2202/1538-0637.1000
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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