Bidding in Mandatory Bankruptcy Auctions: Theory and Evidence

Preprint

1 January 2004

preprint
Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal

https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.635643

Abstract

We present unique empirical tests for overbidding using data from Sweden's auction bankruptcy system. The main creditor (a bank) can neither bid in the auction

Keywords

BANKRUPTCY
AUCTIONS
OVERBIDDING
FIRE SALE
SALEBACK
GOVERNANCE
PREMIUMS
RECOVERY RATES
BANK BIDDING

All Related Versions

Version 1, 2004-01-01, RePEc (Unconfirmed version)
Version 1, 2005-01-01, RePEc (Unconfirmed version)

This publication has 2 references indexed in Scilit:

The Economics of Bankruptcy Reform
Published by National Bureau of Economic Research ,1992
The Uneasy Case for Corporate Reorganizations
The Journal of Legal Studies, 1986