Monitoring multiple agents
- 1 June 1987
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
- Vol. 8 (2) , 279-305
- https://doi.org/10.1016/0167-2681(87)90009-6
Abstract
No abstract availableThis publication has 19 references indexed in Scilit:
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