Do Short‐Term Objectives Lead to Under‐ or Overinvestment in Long‐Term Projects?
- 1 June 1993
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Wiley in The Journal of Finance
- Vol. 48 (2) , 719-729
- https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.1993.tb04735.x
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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