Dangerous Coalitions (for Small Parties): The Electoral Consequences of Government in Spanish Regions and Municipalities

Publisher Website
Google Scholar
Abstract
The goal of the paper is to test the electoral effects of Spanish government at the local and regional level. The analysis reveals several different conclusions regarding incumbency and government composition. First, there is no universal trend in favour of incumbency or government erosion. Instead, participation in government offers political parties an opportunity to become better known and to demonstrate their political capabilities. Second, the clearest incumbency effect occurs in coalition governments, where most electoral redistribution takes place between coalition partners, and not between the government and the opposition. The redistribution pattern favors the larger partner, while the smaller coalition partners suffer significant electoral drawbacks. Finally, the first period of democratic government produces a clear incumbency effect, enabling those parties already in government to gain additional support in the second election.

This publication has 0 references indexed in Scilit: