The Market for Corporate Control: The Empirical Evidence Since 1980
- 1 February 1988
- journal article
- Published by American Economic Association in Journal of Economic Perspectives
- Vol. 2 (1) , 49-68
- https://doi.org/10.1257/jep.2.1.49
Abstract
In the 1980s, the market for corporate control has been increasingly active, and the quantity of output of academic researchers studying corporate control questions has mirrored the market activity. This review examines the returns to bidders and targets, and the effects of defending against hostile takeovers.Keywords
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