When anyone can veto: A laboratory study of committees governed by unanimous rule
- 1 July 1991
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Wiley in Behavioral Science
- Vol. 36 (3) , 179-195
- https://doi.org/10.1002/bs.3830360303
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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