Conditional Probabilities and Probabilities Given Knowledge of a Condition
- 1 March 1983
- journal article
- Published by University of Chicago Press in Philosophy of Science
- Vol. 50 (1) , 82-95
- https://doi.org/10.1086/289091
Abstract
The conditional probability of h given e is commonly claimed to be equal to the probability that h would have if e were learned. Here I contend that this general claim about conditional probabilities is false. I present a counter-example that involves probabilities of probabilities, a second that involves probabilities of possible future actions, and a third that involves probabilities of indicative conditionals. In addition, I briefly defend these counter-examples against charges that the probabilities they involve are illegitimate.Keywords
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