Private Information and Pure-Strategy Equilibria

1 August 1982

journal article
Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Mathematics of Operations Research

Vol. 7 (3) , 401-409
https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.7.3.401

Abstract

In this paper it is proved that in games with a finite number of players and a finite number of moves, if each player observes a private information random variable which has an atomless distribution and is independent of the observations and payoffs of all other players, then the game possesses a pure-strategy equilibrium. Examples are presented that illustrate the importance of the assumptions.

Keywords

PURE STRATEGY
FINITE NUMBER
ATOMLESS DISTRIBUTION
PLAYER OBSERVES
STRATEGY EQUILIBRIUM
STRATEGY EQUILIBRIA
GAME POSSESSES
INFORMATION RANDOM
RANDOM VARIABLE

This publication has 0 references indexed in Scilit: