Game-theoretic approaches to urban planning and design

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Abstract
In this paper the urban-planning process is explored and modelled using a variety of concepts and techniques drawn from the theory of games, The rationale for using game theory as a basis for simulating the design process is presented first, and this serves to highlight the major features of such processes in terms of bargaining and the implied power positions of the players involved. In the second section these ideas are given substance through a description of a case study based on the choice of location of a town to accept overspill population from a large conurbation, and a number of conceptual game-theoretic models of parts of this process are presented. By developing game theory nonalgebraically in terms of this case study, it is then possible to generate a set of formal models based on stochastic game thoery, as first suggested by Shapley (1953). These models are presented theoretically in the third section, and in terms of their algorithms and application in section four. These models include several different features including a multigame stochastic format in which participants move between game elements according to transition probabilities conditional on their joint decisions, an hierarchical property which enables participants to move between various levels of negotiation, and the use of the nucleolus, a cooperative-game-solution concept first introduced by Schmeidler (1969), An evaluation of the strengths and weaknesses of game theory in this context forms the conclusion.

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