Arms, Alliances, and Security Tradeoffs in Enduring Rivalries

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Abstract
Recent work on alliances, notably Walt (1987, 1988), emphasizes that states form alliances to balance against threats. In this article, I construct a constrained optimization model to demonstrate that a mix of arms and alliance is a better characterization of states' security policies. States choose the mix according to the relative costs associated with each approach, as well as the level of their allies' military capabilities. I test the predictions of the model using econometric analysis of data on France and Austria prior to World War I and Israel and Syria in the contemporary period. The empirical results illustrate states' tendencies to rely on their allies' arms when allied support is relatively cheap and their allies are militarily strong; whereas they tend to rely on their own capabilities when allied support is relatively costly and their allies are militarily weak.

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