Abstract
In many countries almost all cabinet ministers are military and civil officials. We can explain this phenomenon if we first consider the relative power (or weakness) of extra- bureaucratic institutions, such as political parties and elected assemblies, and the position of the head of government. When such structures are very weak—as they are in many Third World countries—or even nonexistent—power devolves in large measure upon the state bureaucracy (military as well as civil). It appears to be almost unavoidable that, under such conditions, a small conspiratorial group of men, mainly military officers, should succeed in grasping power by means of a coup d'état. The will, then, also name to cabinet positions some of their associates in the public services, including both civil and military officials, and nonpromoters of the coup d'état as well as some of its pro moters. This type of recruitment dynamics is exemplified in a case study based on con temporary Thai history.

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