Manipulation of social choice functions
- 1 October 1976
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Theory
- Vol. 13 (2) , 217-228
- https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(76)90016-8
Abstract
No abstract availableThis publication has 6 references indexed in Scilit:
- Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functionsJournal of Economic Theory, 1975
- Stability of sincere voting under some classes of non-binary group decision proceduresJournal of Economic Theory, 1974
- On the stability of sincere voting situationsJournal of Economic Theory, 1973
- Aggregation of Preferences with Variable ElectorateEconometrica, 1973
- Positionalist voting functionsTheory and Decision, 1973
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General ResultEconometrica, 1973