On the dispensability of public randomization in discounted repeated games
- 1 April 1991
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Theory
- Vol. 53 (2) , 428-438
- https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(91)90163-x
Abstract
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This publication has 5 references indexed in Scilit:
- Nash and perfect equilibria of discounted repeated gamesJournal of Economic Theory, 1990
- The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete InformationEconometrica, 1986
- On Repeated Games with Complete InformationMathematics of Operations Research, 1986
- Equilibrium in supergames with the overtaking criterionJournal of Economic Theory, 1979
- A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for SupergamesThe Review of Economic Studies, 1971