Optimal environmental regulation under asymmetric information
- 1 March 1988
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Public Economics
- Vol. 35 (2) , 163-181
- https://doi.org/10.1016/0047-2727(88)90052-7
Abstract
No abstract availableThis publication has 16 references indexed in Scilit:
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