On the rebustness of perfect equilibrium in fixed cost sequential bargaining under an isomorphic transformation
- 31 May 1991
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Economics Letters
- Vol. 36 (1) , 21-24
- https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(91)90049-q
Abstract
No abstract availableThis publication has 7 references indexed in Scilit:
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