Top dominance and the possibility of strategy-proof stable solutions to matching problems
- 1 May 1994
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Springer Nature in Economic Theory
- Vol. 4 (3) , 417-435
- https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01215380
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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