Stewardship Theory or Agency Theory: CEO Governance and Shareholder Returns
- 1 June 1991
- journal article
- Published by SAGE Publications in Australian Journal of Management
- Vol. 16 (1) , 49-64
- https://doi.org/10.1177/031289629101600103
Abstract
Agency theory argues that shareholder interests require protection by separation of incumbency of rôles of board chair and CEO. Stewardship theory argues shareholder interests are maximised by shared incumbency of these rôles. Results of an empirical test fail to support agency theory and provide some support for stewardship theory.Keywords
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