An Illustration of the Essential Difference between Individual and Social Learning, and its Consequences for Computational Analyses
Preprint
- 1 January 1999
- preprint
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Abstract
Drawing a conclusion from recent insights in evolutionary game theory, we show that a so-called spite-effect implies that there is an essential difference betweKeywords
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