Democracy, Elections, and Accountability for Economic Outcomes

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Abstract
Our purpose is to examine the empirical validity of two propositions: that democracy is a political regime distinguished by the accountability of rulers to the ruled, and that elections are the mechanism through which this accountability is enforced. These propositions are obviously related: the first follows from the second one by the definition of democracy as a regime in which rulers are selected by elections. Hence, the structure of the argument we intend to examine is that (1) democracy is a system that enforces accountability (empirical hypothesis), because (2) democracy is a regime in which rulers are chosen by elections (definition), and (3) accountability is enforced by elections (empirical hypothesis). If all of this appears pedantic, hold on. We begin by spelling out our criteria for classifying political regimes, distinguishing different types of democracy and dictatorship, and providing some background information about their incidence. After we analyze statistically the impact of economic conditions on the survival of heads of governments, we study how rulers are selected under different forms of democracy and focus on the role of elections as a mechanism of accountability. A brief conclusion, mainly a list of doubts, closes the chapter. Political Regimes We classify as democracies regimes that during a particular year simultaneously satisfy four criteria: (1) the chief executive is elected (directly or indirectly), (2) the legislature is elected, (3) more than one party competes in elections, (4) incumbent parties have in the past or will have in the future lost an election and yielded office.

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