The Role of the Economic Agencies in the Enforcement of International Judgments and Awards: A Functional Approach

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Abstract
Enforcement of international decisions and awards has not enjoyed universal recognition as a problem. Judgment-enforcement, it has been contended, is separable from the general question of sanctions; since submission to adjudication and arbitration in international law is voluntary, it is argued, a state will not submit a particular dispute to third-party settlement unless it has already reconciled itself to the possibility of losing the case. By logical reduction this argument must conclude that there have been no cases of noncompliance. Other writers assure compliance by pointing to the “moral force” of a decision. Given the decentralized structure of the international arena, the “horizontal” allocation of control, and the fact that international affairs hover so perilously close to crisis level, it is tempting to accept the nonexistence of an enforcement problem and thus to sidestep the necessity for formulating enforcement strategies. The wisdom of this course of action is questionable: “Leaving things well enough alone” may, arguably, not make them worse, but it will also not make them better. Organized international decision processes (which include adjudication and arbitration as well as a host of less institutionalized decision processes) counteract relative international anarchy. The efficacy of these decision processes depends upon compliance with or enforcement of their decisions.

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