Linguistic universals as evidence for empiricism

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Abstract
I. Noam Chomsky turned the previously rather specialized discipline of linguistics into a subject of considerable general philosophical interest by his argument that the discovery of universal properties of natural language requires us to adopt a ‘nativist’ or ‘rationalist’ view of human mind – a view according to which ‘our systems of belief are those that the mind, as a biological structure, is designed to construct’ (Chomsky, 1976: 7). (I shall use the terms ‘nativism’ and ‘rationalism’ interchangeably in this article, since any difference we make between them is not important in the context of Chomsky's work. The truth is that, as with many philosophical ‘isms’, the two words do duty for a range of many more than two closely related, partly overlapping theses.) When Chomsky began publishing, a widespread attitude to human language was that expressed by Martin Joos (1957: 96): ‘languages [can] differ from each other without limit and in unpredictable ways’. Chomsky claims that this is false: to quote one of his favourite examples, it is perfectly possible to imagine a language which forms yes/no questions simply by reversing the order of the words in the corresponding statements, yet in fact no natural language has a rule remotely like this (even though this rule seems rather simpler, in an absolute sense, than many of the rules which are found in natural languages). Human languages differ in some respects, but in other respects they are all cut to a common pattern. Much of Chomsky's and his followers' work consists of formulating and testing increasingly refined hypotheses about the precise limits within which natural languages may vary.

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