International Reserves: Precautionary vs. Mercantilist Views, Theory, and Evidence
- 1 January 2005
- journal article
- Published by International Monetary Fund (IMF) in IMF Working Papers
- Vol. 5 (198)
- https://doi.org/10.5089/9781451862171.001
Abstract
This paper compares the importance of precautionary and mercantilist motives in the hoarding of international reserves by developing countries. Overall, empirical results support precautionary motives; in particular, a more liberal capital account regime increases international reserves. Theoretically, large precautionary demand for international reserves arises as a self-insurance to avoid costly liquidation of long-term projects when the economy is susceptible to sudden stops. The welfare gain from the optimal management of international reserves is of a first-order magnitude, reducing the welfare cost of liquidity shocks from a first-order to a second-order magnitude.Keywords
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