Abstract
Suggesting that licensing may not only fail to accomplish its intended purpose, but may be counterproductive, the author asserts that licensing may not improve the quality of professional services, that licensing boards fail to discipline unethical or incompetent practitioners, and that actions taken against the unlicensed are more often aimed at eliminating competition, not incompetence. In addition, licensing laws may have negative side effects, including an increase in the cost of professional services, the creation of shortages and maldistributions in supply, ineffective use of paraprofessionals, and impediments to needed reforms in education, training, and services. He concludes that equally effective alternatives may be available that are less expensive and have less negative impact, and advocates a system of registration for all practitioners, as well as making other suggestions to improve the overall functioning of licensing boards. Finally, because of political realities, the author proposes a compromise between his ideal model and the current system.

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