Optimal labor contracts with non-contractible human capital
- 31 December 1989
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of the Japanese and International Economies
- Vol. 3 (4) , 385-402
- https://doi.org/10.1016/0889-1583(89)90010-5
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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