Relative risk aversion, incentive effects, and risk sharing
- 1 December 1990
- journal article
- Published by Springer Nature in Atlantic Economic Journal
- Vol. 18 (4) , 38-41
- https://doi.org/10.1007/bf02299017
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
This publication has 8 references indexed in Scilit:
- Piecewise Linear Incentive SchemesThe Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 1988
- The First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent ProblemsEconometrica, 1985
- New Directions in the Economic Theory of AgencyCanadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, 1984
- An Analysis of the Principal-Agent ProblemEconometrica, 1983
- Optimal incentive contracts with imperfect informationJournal of Economic Theory, 1979
- Moral Hazard and ObservabilityThe Bell Journal of Economics, 1979
- Risk Sharing and Incentives in the Principal and Agent RelationshipThe Bell Journal of Economics, 1979
- Incentives and Risk Sharing in SharecroppingThe Review of Economic Studies, 1974