The Role of Inferences in Sequential Bargaining with One-Sided Incomplete Information: Some Experimental Evidence
- 1 May 2001
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes
- Vol. 85 (1) , 166-187
- https://doi.org/10.1006/obhd.2000.2936
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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