On the social constitution of mind: Bruner, Ilyenkov, and the defence of cultural psychology

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Abstract
The focus of this paper is “strong culturalist theories of mind”, i.e., those that argue that culture is constitutive of mind and thus that the nature and content of an individual's mental life cannot be understood independently of the culture of which that individual is a part. While such theories can be advanced on empirical grounds, it is tempting for the culturalist to seek some broad philosophical arguments that will show that the opposing positions (e.g., reductionism, eliminitivism) rest on fatal conceptual confusions. But how realistic is it to look to philosophy for a vindication of strong culturalism? The paper setsout Jerome Bruner's recent defence of a strong culturalist position and, after exploring ambiguities and unclarities in Bruner's view of the status of the mental, considers whether his position can be strengthened by appeal to the writings of Russian philosopher Evald Ilyenkov. It is argued that, although Ilyenkov's work nicely complements Bruner's, it falls short of conclusively resolving the issue infavour of culturalism. Nevertheless, Ilyenkov's work is a powerful source ofmetaphors, ideas and arguments that force us to interrogate the images of mind and world that predominate in our intellectual culture and often (tacitly) influence the building of empirical theories. His work thus illustrates that there is a significant role for philosophers to play in the defence of culturalism even if it is unrealistic to expect a compelling a priori defence of the position.

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