The optimality of tit‐for‐tat

Publisher Website
Google Scholar
Abstract
The paper examines the performance of tit‐for‐tat in iterated plays of prisoners’ dilemma and chicken. In particular, the paper examines, via computer simulations, a space of surrogate Axelrod‐type tournaments over these games. The surrogate tournaments are specified in terms of characteristics of strategies similar to those Axelrod identifies as fundamental. The paper shows that the zones of optimality for tit‐for‐tat in tournament play of both prisoners’ dilemma and chicken remarkably constrained, but that tit‐for‐tat generally does well relative to other strategies. Furthermore, our results show that the success of tit‐for‐tat is sensitive to the number of players and the assignment of payoff values.

This publication has 3 references indexed in Scilit: