Reductionism and the Unification Theory of Explanation
- 1 March 1995
- journal article
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Philosophy of Science
- Vol. 62 (1) , 21-30
- https://doi.org/10.1086/289836
Abstract
P. Kitcher's unification theory of explanation appears to endorse a reductionistic view of scientific explanation that is inconsistant with scientific practice. In this paper, I argue that this appearance is illusory. The existence of multiply realizable generalizations enable the unification theory to also count many high-level accounts as explanatory.Keywords
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