Equilibrium Directed Search with Multiple Applications

Preprint
Publisher Website
Google Scholar
  • 1 January 2003
    • preprint
      • Published in RePEc
Abstract
We analyse a model of equilibrium directed search in a large labour market. Each worker, observing the wages posted at all vacancies, makes a fixed, finite number of applications, a. We allow for the possibility of ex post competition should more than one vacancy want to hire the same worker. For each a, there is a unique symmetric equilibrium in which all vacancies post the same wage. When a= 1, the common posted wage lies between the competitive and monopsony levels, and equilibrium is efficient. When a > 1, all vacancies post the monopsony wage. Some workers fail to find a job, some find a job at the monopsony wage, and some—those for whom there is competition—get the competitive wage. Equilibrium is inefficient when a > 1; in particular, there is excessive vacancy creation. See the publication in the Review of Economic Studies , 2006, 73(4) 869-91.

This publication has 0 references indexed in Scilit: