Alternative disciplinary mechanisms in different corporate systems
- 1 January 1995
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
- Vol. 26 (1) , 17-34
- https://doi.org/10.1016/0167-2681(94)00018-a
Abstract
No abstract availableThis publication has 33 references indexed in Scilit:
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