Agency Cost Of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers
Preprint
- 1 January 1999
- preprint
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Abstract
The interests and incentives of managers and shareholders conflict over such issues as the optimal size of the firm and the payment of cash to shareholders. TheKeywords
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